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HEALTH LAW
INTRODUCTION
Public health is an increasing global concern.' Governments have
ranked public health as among their foremost concerns. 2 "[H]ealth care is
an important social value, so fundamental to the realization of other
rights, that it should be given particular legal protection and promotion
within our society."3 During the survey period,4 the Tenth Circuit de-
cided three significant cases pertaining to health law. Since health law
encompasses so many aspects of American law,5 these recent Tenth Cir-
cuit decisions are quite disparate. This article analyzes these decisions.
Part I provides a general background of health law. Part II explores the
abortion issue. Part III examines dietary supplement regulations, and Part
IV discusses the physician/hospital relationship, paying particular atten-
tion to a physician's hospital privileges.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution does not explicitly give the federal
government the authority to regulate public health.6 The Commerce
1. Virginia Leary et al., Health, Human Rights and International Law, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 122, 122 (1988) (indicating that Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) has
international implications).
2. See Ashley W. Warren, Comment, Preemption of Claims Related to Class III Medical
Devices: Are the Federal Objectives of Public Health and Safety Furthered or Hindered?, 49 SMU
L. REV. 619, 621 (1996); see also LAURENE A. GRAIG, HEALTH OF NATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTiVE ON U.S. HEALTH CARE REFORM 3 (1993) (indicating that concern around the world is
focused on developing strategies to manage the rapidly increasing health care costs); Edward 0.
Correia, State and Local Regulation of Cigarette Advertising, 23 J. LEGIS. 1, 6 n.22 (1997) (stating
that public health is among a local government's primary concern); Conquering Disease as an
Enemy of Empire, TIMES LONDON, Aug. 15, 1997, at 9, available in 1997 WL 9222940 (indicating
that the maintenance of public health was a high priority in Victorian Britain); Mozambican Presi-
dent Pledges to Improve Workers' Living Conditions, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRE, May 1, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 3759913 (stating that public health is ranked as Mozambique's government's
priority); P.K. Roy, India: On a District Formation Spree, HINDU, May 12, 1997, at 17, available in
1997 WL 9971024 (stating that public health is among the Indian government's priorities for which
they use very limited funds).
3. See Carlo V. DiFlorio, Comment, Assessing Universal Access to Health Care: An Analysis
of Legal Principle and Economic Feasibility, II DICK. J. INT'L L. 139, 160 (1992).
4. The survey period extended from September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997.
5. Aspects of civil law that affect health care regulation include tort law, contract law, and
governmental regulations. ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW 2 (1996). Health
law increasingly involves criminal law as the government expands its use of the criminal law system
to create systemic changes in the health care industry. Id.
6. The United States Constitution declares that among the common goals of the people, is the
goal to "promote the general Welfare." U.S. CONST. preamble; see also Kellen McClendon, Do
Hospitals in Pennsylvania Relieve the Government of Some of Its Burden?, 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 517,
573 (1994). It is interesting to note that in other countries, health care is considered a human fight
and provided for all citizens. See Jeanne M. Woods, The Fallacy of Neutrality: Diary of an Election
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Clause7 delegates to the federal government the ability to regulate inter-
state commerce! As such, the federal government may regulate public
health insofar as it affects interstate commerce.9 The responsibility for
the maintenance of public health, however, mostly resides with state
governments under the police powers. ° Under the police powers, the
state has extensive authority to regulate its' public health." Traditionally,
state governments have delegated some of this authority to local gov-
ernments.
12
The controversy surrounding health care coverage has gained na-
tional attention in recent years. In theory, health care insurance is avail-
able to all Americans through four avenues. The government provides
Medicare 13 for the elderly and disabled; and Medicaid 4 for those with
Observer, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 475, 523 (1997) (indicating that health care is included in South
Africa's new constitution).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189-203 (1824).
9. Joy Elizabeth Matak, Note, Telemedicine: Medical Treatment Via Telecommunications
Will Save Lives, But Can Congress Answer the Call? Federal Preemption of State Licensure Re-
quirements Under Congressional Commerce Clause Authority & Spending Power, 22 VT. L. REV.
231, 245 (1997).
10. See Hellebust v. Brownback, 42 F.3d 1331, 1335 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that pursuant to
the state's police powers, the state may guarantee the quality of meat and dairy products that every-
one in the state consumes, ensure the accuracy of the scales as the basis for charging consumers,
control the use and diversion of water, and regulate the use of pesticides). Congress and the Clinton
administration agreed on a 1998 budget provision allotting $24 billion to states to fund children's
health initiatives. See Karen Jacobs, On Your Own: Gloria Brown Wants to Buy Health Insurance;
She Just Can't Afford It, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1997, at RI0; see also Howard D. Cohen & Taylor
Mattis, Prepayment Rights: Abrogation By the Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident
Homeownership Act of 1990, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1,32 (1993).
11. See Cohen & Mattis, supra note 10, at 32; see also Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Economics
and Politics of Emergency Health Care for the Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma, 1992 BYU L.
REV. 971, 975 n.13 (1992) ("Over the years, state government responsibility for public health ex-
penditures has varied from about 12 to 14%, while federal government responsibility has varied
from 11 to 30% [which has] led to a power struggle between the national and state governments in
terms of who will pay what, who will cover what, and who is actually running the program.").
12. See Josephine Gittler, Controlling Resurgent Tuberculosis: Public Health Agencies, Pub-
lic Policy, and Law, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 107, 108 (1994).
13. The Medicare program is administered by the Social Security Administration of the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994). Medicare does not cover
prescription drugs or long-term care and, until recently, Medicare did not cover liver transplants.
Robert Baker, Rationing, Rhetoric, and Rationality: A Review of the Health Care Rationing Debate
in America and Europe, in ALLOCATING HEALTH CARE RESOURCES 57, 60 (James M. Humber &
Robert F. Almeder eds., 1995).
14. Hylton, supra note 11, at 1022 n. 13. Medicaid is designed to provide funds to the blind,
the disabled, and families receiving aid for dependent children in order to cover selected health
services. Id. Medicaid does not cover all expenses. It is jointly subsidized by federal and state gov-
ernments. Id. (indicating that "over the years, state government responsibility has varied from about
12 to 14%, while federal government responsibility has varied from about I 1 to 30%"). The Medi-
caid program is administered by individual states according to a plan the state adopted in conformity
with federal regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994). As a result, benefits are inconsistent from state to
state. Hylton, supra note 11, at 1022.
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low incomes or certain disabilities. 5 In addition, some employers pro-
vide subsidized coverage for their employees. 6 Finally, coverage can be
purchased on an individual basis. 7 Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) pride themselves on providing preventative care for
individuals. Ironically, however, individuals suffering from chronic
illness, those who stand to gain the most from preventative medicine, are
often denied coverage under HMOs' cost-cutting policies. 9
Americans increasingly call upon medical care and health care2" to
satisfy the needs of a changing and expanding population. The public
outcry for universal health coverage2' pressures the health care system to
reform.22 Rapid technological advances are required to meet society's
demand for improved medical care.23 Medical advances can create new
opportunities for people suffering from chronic illnesses, 2 but these
technological advancements must be regulated to ensure the safety of the
consumer.
25
The issue is no longer just whether the health care field should be
regulated by the government, but instead, how much regulation is neces-
sary and within constitutional limits. 26 The government must weigh the
15. See DiFlorio, supra note 3, at 148.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Test Over Time: Managed Care is Geared Toward Preventing
Illness; But What About People with Chronic Ailments?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1997, at R6. Preven-
tative care includes such things as regular checkups, in other words, medicine designed to keep
healthy people healthy. Id. In the long run, huge savings result from preventative medicine through
early diagnosis. Id.
19. See id.
20. The difference between medical care and health care is that providing access to health care
does not guarantee that everyone will get the same medical care. EMERGENCY! HEALTH CARE IN
AMERICA (ABC News 1992) (interviewing Dr. June Osborne, Dean of the University of Michigan
School of Public Health).
21. The current health care system in the U.S. lacks a social definition of equity, feebly at-
tempts to contain costs, inadequately covers millions of Americans, and does not cover another 37
million Americans. DiFlorio, supra note 3, at 139.
22. The discontent with the current health care system consistently inspires proposals for
reform. Louise G. Trubek & Elizabeth A. Hoffman, Searching for a Balance in Universal Health
Care Reform: Protection for the Disenfranchised Consumer, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1994)
(indicating that the health reform project has been attempted several times without success during
the 40 years prior to 1994).
23. See Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent Legisla-
tion, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329 (1997) (discussing the conflict between a desire for improved health
care and granting patents to inventors of medical advancements).
24. See Jeffrey, supra note 18 (discussing chronic illnesses like diabetes and asthma).
25. See Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1015-16 (1997) (reporting that the rapid pace of devel-
opments of medical technology challenges the health care profession because "funding all interven-
tions that would provide some health benefit to some patient would preclude spending on any other
desirable social good"); see also Brad Dallet, Note, Economic Credentialing: Your Money or Your
Life!, 4 HEALTH MATRIX 325, 325 (1994) (indicating the relationship between the physician and
patient is changing along with the economic changes in health care).
26. See McClendon, supra note 6, at 573. McClendon stated:
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interest in preserving and promoting life2 7 against an individual's consti-
tutional rights." These issues are particularly relevant in light of recent
health crises, including AIDS,29 assisted suicide,3' and the controversy
surrounding abortion."
Central to most medical care issues is the medical care provider, the
physician. State governments administer the majority of the physician
licensing standards.32 Medical care below the standard may result in in-
jury to the patient and the patient may have a malpractice claim.33 A phy-
sician's misdiagnosis is not considered negligence if the patient does not
When the public health is involved, a person's liberty to choose how to care for himself
or herself gives way to the requirement of the state.... [W]hen medical care is involved,
the concern is for the good of the individual; when public health is involved the concern
is for the good of the public.
Id. But ".[i]t is legitimate for state government to regulate the conduct of an individual where that
conduct presents a risk to the health, safety, or welfare of others, but it also may be legitimate where
the regulation is only for the protection of that individual."' Id. (quoting KENNETH R. WING, THE
LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 20 (2d ed. 1995)).
27. See U.S. CONST. preamble.
28. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271, 2775 (1997) (addressing the notion
that the "lives of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly people must be no less valued than the lives of
the young and healthy"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) ("At the heart of liberty
is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State."); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
282 (1990) (stating that a government has an "unqualified interest in the preservation of human
life"); see also Samantha Catherine Halem, Note, At What Cost?: An Argument Against Mandatory
AZT Treatment of HIV-Positive Pregnant Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491, 492 (1997)
(concluding that a mandatory AZT treatment regime for people with AIDS would be unconstitu-
tional).
29. See Susan Fox Buchanan, Medical Ethics at the Millennium: A Brief Retrospective, COLO.
LAW., June 1997, at 141, 142 (1997) (asserting that the physician/patient confidentiality may have an
exception in the case of "hazardous communicable diseases" such as AIDS); Margaret Salmon
Rivas, The California AIDS Initiative and the Food and Drug Administration: Working at Odds with
Each Other?, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 107 (1991) (discussing why the United States has fallen
behind other countries in adopting a national policy on AIDS); Halem, supra note 28, at 491 (ana-
lyzing the constitutionality of mandatory AZT treatment of pregnant women).
30. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (upholding a New York statute prohibit-
ing assisted suicide); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271, 2775 (1997) (indicating that
the "asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause" and that "Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least rea-
sonably related to [the] promotion and protection" of the state's interests); see also Leonard J.
Deftos, Physician Assistance in Dying: The Supreme Court Should Limit But Not Prohibit,
POSTGRADUATE MED., June 1, 1997, at 13 (reviewing Vacco and Glucksberg); Linda C. Fentiman,
Law and Ethics at the End of Life: High Court Speaks, Where do We Stand After Decisions on Phy-
sician Assisted Suicide?, 218 N.Y. L.J. 5 (1997).
31. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (1973).
32. See Katopis, supra note 23, at 386-87.
33. DAVID CUNIFF & MARY ELLEN MCCARTHY, THE RIGHT MEDICINE 223 (1994). Patients
may take legal action when physicians make mistakes. See, e.g., SAL FISCINA & JANET B. SEIFERT,
LEGAL CHECK-UP FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR THE HEALTH CARE TEAM
40, 46-47 (1997) (describing situations in which legal action was taken against physicians who made
mistakes).
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disclose information central to the diagnosis, despite the physician's in-
quiry.34 However, if a physician finds conflicting information and has
reason to question it, she must take proper steps to clarify the issue.35
The most extensively regulated institutions include health care fa-
cilities and hospitals.' Health care facilities are held liable for mistakes
related to care37 and hospitals may be held responsible for its physicians'
actions. 38 Therefore, many facilities have established a peer review proc-
ess among the medical staff in an effort to guarantee that physicians per-
form adequately. 39 The review committee evaluates each physician's
performance, and compares the care offered with what a "reasonable




The term abortion is derived from the Latin word "aboriri," to mis-
carry. 41 The word evolved into the present, common usage of a "deliber-
ate termination of a pregnancy." '42 Abortion is an issue that has divided
America.43 Current law dictates that a woman has a limited constitutional
right to an abortion.' Courts considering abortion issues must confront
the validity of the legal justification for limiting legislative power to
regulate the availability of abortions.45
The text of the Constitution does not specifically make reference to
abortion nor a right to privacy. 46 However, the Supreme Court has inter-
34. See FISCINA & SEIFERT, supra note 33, at 46.
35. See id at 47. Physician care for different types of patients is delineated. Id. at 67-70. The
duty a physician owes to a non-patient is determined partly by the relationship the physician has with
the actual patient in connection with the non-patient. Id. at 83.
36. MILLER, supra note 5, at 43.
37. Dallet, supra note 25, at 326-27.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See FISCINA & SEIFERT, supra note 33, at 45.
41. See Gwendolyn Prothro, RU 486 Examined: Impact of a New Technology on an Old
Controversy, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 715, 717 (1997).
42. See id. at 717; Theodore Joyce et al., The Impact of Mississippi's Mandatory Delay Law
on Abortions and Births, 278 JAMA 653 (1997) ("Of the approximately 6.5 million pregnancies in
the United States in 1992, 1.5 million or 23% were voluntarily terminated.").
43. See American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Adolescence, The Adolescent's Right
To Confidential Care When Considering Abortion, PEDIATRICS, May 1, 1996, at 746; Prothro, supra
note 41, at 715-16.
44. See Prothro, supra note 41, at 721. See also 141 CONG. REC. E1690 (daily ed. Aug. 5,
1995) (statement of Rep. Hoekstra) (indicating that hospitals are now required to incorporate man-
datory training for abortions as part of their family planning instruction but medical students whose
moral or religious beliefs prevent them from performing abortions are exempted).
45. See 141 CONG. REC. E1690 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hoekstra).
46. SeeRoev. Wade, 410U.S. 113(1973).
1998]
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preted the Constitution to protect enumerated rights47 and certain unenu-
merated rights. 48 In order to determine if the Constitution provides for an
unenumerated right, the Court considers the degree to which these rights
are a part of the traditions of the United States 9 The Supreme Court's
decisions have been relatively consistent, recognizing unenumerated
rights in its decisions.5" For example, the right to privacy is considered an
unenumerated, fundamental right;5' the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses provide the foundation for protection of the privacy of its
citizens. 2 The fundamental right to privacy has been extended to include
marriage, contraception, abortion, child-rearing, education, and family
relationships.1
3
The development of abortion case law paralleled the case law on the
right to use contraceptives. 54 The Court recognized the right of marital
56privacy55 and a married couple's right to use contraceptives. As a result,
the Court determined that abortion, unlike assisted suicide, 7 is a funda-
47. For example, the Constitution explicitly grants that citizens possess the rights to free
speech, to keep and bear arms, and to confront witnesses against defendants in criminal trials. U.S.
CONST. amends. I, II, VI.
48. See Oversight Hearing on the Origins and Scope of Roe v. Wade Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (April 22, 1996), available in
1996 WL 10162661 (statement by Mark Tushnet, Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown
University Law Center, regarding the history of abortion rights and Roe v. Wade) [hereinafter Tush-
net]. Unenumerated rights define a set of constitutional rights which, although necessary, are not
provided in the text of the Constitution. Ronald Dworkin, Exchanges, Unenumerated Rights:
Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 386 (1992). Among these
rights are the right of travel and the right of association. Id.
49. Stephen Aaron Silver, Note, Beyond Jafee v. Redmond: Should the Federal Courts Rec-
ognize a Right to Physician-Patient Confidentiality? 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1809, 1835 (1998). The
sources of unenumerated rights are state law or a "natural law of fundamental rights." See Tushnet,
supra note 48 ("Once we recognize unenumerated rights based on a higher law, it is hard to under-
stand why only the national government has to respect those rights.").
50. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down involuntary sterilization of
certain recidivist felons as violative of the basic human right to procreate); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
87, 139 (1810) (recognizing "general principals which are common to our free institutions"); Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) (identifying "certain vital principles in our free Republican govern-
ments").
51. See KAREN O'CONNOR, No NEUTRAL GROUND?: ABORTION POLITICS IN AN AGE OF
ABSOLUTES 40 (1996) (discussing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
52. See Tushnet, supra note 48.
53. See Joan E. Schaffner, The Essence of Marriage, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 195, 212
(1997). In the future the right to privacy may extend to apply to homosexual relationships. Id.
54. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992).
55. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
56. See id.; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The Court also
identified the right of unmarried couples' use of contraceptives. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).




mental right, and consequently the Court is constitutionally justified in
regulating the legislative determinations on abortions."
The Supreme Court exercised this power in Roe v. Wade, which es-
tablished a woman's constitutional right to an abortion. 9 The Roe Court
determined that the viability of the fetus' was the first point at which the
state could declare an interest in the fetal life, and could constitutionally
ban non-therapeutic abortions.6 Prior to viability, if the government were
to attempt to interfere in the woman's right to an abortion, it would have
to establish a "compelling'2 reason.63 The first trimester of a woman's
pregnancy cannot be regulated.64 During the second trimester, the gov-
ernment can only interfere to the extent that the interference safeguards
the mother's health. 5 Thereafter, whenever fetal viability is reached, the
government may interfere to protect the interests of the fetus, provided
an abortion is not necessary to protect the woman's health.
66
Since 1973, subsequent cases have interpreted and limited this
right.67 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth68 recognized the Roe Court's
determination that "viability" was a medical judgment and the essence of
the term was to remain flexible to interpretation. 69 Upholding Roe, Dan-
forth determined that is was not the role of legislatures or courts to spe-
cifically define viability, that is, to determine at which point viability is
actually achieved.7" Rather, it is a medical decision influenced by various
factors unique to each pregnancy.1 In City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health2 the Court stated that parental involvement for mi-
nors was constitutionally permissible, but a bypass mechanism providing
58. See Tushnet, supra note 48.
59. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53,154 (1973); O'CONNOR, supra note 51, at 46;
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 11 (1990) (stating that Roe v. Wade
codified the right to an abortion as a privacy right as had been determined by earlier cases).
60. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-61.
61. See id. at 163-64. A therapeutic abortion is when the abortion is "necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother." Id.
62. Id. at 162-63.
63. SeeTRIBE, supranote 59, at 11-12.
64. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see TRIBE, supra note 59, at 12.
67. See Jennifer L. Stevenson, Supreme Court Rulings on Abortion, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1997, at 4D (stating that since 1973 there have been 26 cases related to abortion on the U.S.
Supreme Court's docket); see also 139 CONG. REC. S195 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (discussing the
Freedom of Choice Act and the need for its affirmation to ensure that a woman's fundamental right
to chose is preserved as according to Roe).
68. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
69. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 62-63.
70. Id. at 64.
71. Id.
72. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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for approval by a judge must also be available for those minors who can-
not obtain parental permission.73
In a series of cases, the Court articulated the difference between a di-
rect interference with a woman's right to choose an abortion and an indi-
rect deterrence on that right.74 In 1989, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services75 challenged the Roe precedent.76 The abortion opponents ar-
gued for mandatory testing that would ascertain the viability of the
fetus.77 Because the composition of the Court had changed since Roe,78
many questioned whether the right to choose an abortion would survive,
but Roe was upheld. 79
Justice O'Connor was the motivating force. O'Connor articulated the
standard of evaluation established by Roe and subsequent cases"0 as the
"undue burden" test.8 In Webster, the Court determined that the regula-
tions at issue did not place an "undue burden" on the woman, and there-
fore the state regulations were upheld.82 O'Connor's decision left Roe
73. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. at 427 n. 10.
74. See TRIBE, supra note 59, at 16 (stating that "in the years following Roe one could safely
predict that direct restrictions on abortions would be overturned"); see, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980) (stating that a denial of federal Medicaid funds for a therapeutic abortion was not
unconstitutional); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (stating that a public hospital owned by the
city was not required to provide nontherapeutic abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)
(determining that a state regulation that denied state Medicaid funds for non-therapeutic abortions
was constitutional).
75. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
76. See TRIBE, supra note 59, at 20 (stating that "the government of Missouri ... and the Bush
administration both urged the Court to take the Webster case as an occasion to reconsider its decision
in Roe v. Wade"). This case was so remarkable because the law being challenged provided "a re-
striction on the performance of abortions in public institutions, even when the woman would be
paying her own bill; a preamble in the statute that declares that 'the life of each human being begins
at conception;' and a regulatory requirement that a number of tests of fetal viability be performed
when a woman seeking an abortion is believed to be twenty weeks pregnant." Id.; see also LESLIE J.
REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES,
1867-1973 251 (1997) (discussing Webster).
77. Webster, 492 U.S. at 490.
78. See TRIBE, supra note 59, at 20 (stating that the additions of Justice Scalia and Justice
Kennedy would really test the foundation of Roe).
79. Webster, 492 U.S. at 513-14.
80. For an early articulation of a "burden" test, see Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1967).
Even earlier, the Court articulated the "maximum destructive impact" test. See Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (indicating that a prohibition on the use of contraceptives would
have a maximum destructive impact on a marital relationship). For an abortion case that articulated a
"burden" test, see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193-95 (1973) (articulating the "unconstitutional
burden" test).
81. See TRIBE, supra note 59, at 23. Previous cases have described the test as "unconstitution-
ally burdensome" on the woman's right to choose an abortion. Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Brennan,
and Marshall followed this standard in their opinions in Webster. Id; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973). Justice O'Connor actually devised the undue burden test. TRIBE, supra note 59, at
23.
82. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 23.
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open to future modifications, including the possibility of being over-
turned. 3
In 1992, the Roe decision was slightly modified by Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey. 4 In Casey, the plaintiffs, abortion clinics, and physicians,
challenged the constitutionality of several sections of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act of 1982.85 The Casey Court rejected Roe's trimes-
ter framework8 6 and adopted the "undue burden" standard. 7 The Court
determined that this standard applied in evaluating the constitutionality
of legislative actions influencing a woman's right to an abortion.88 The
Casey Court asserted that if the statute or regulation has "the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus," then it creates an undue burden on the
woman.89 The undue burden standard allows courts to analyze a statute
under two prongs: the legislative purpose intended by the statute, cou-
pled with the actual effect of the statute.90 Arguably the Casey decision
weakened a woman's right to choose an abortion.9'
Under the guidance of this Supreme Court precedent, courts have
considered what constitutes an undue burden and what makes a fetus
viable. The "undue burden" standard is a determination made by the
courts. Legal experts have since drawn an analogy between constitutional
rights in right-to-die cases and the undue burden on the right to an abor-
83. Id. at 24.
84. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
85. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. These sections included:
[Section] 3205, which requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed con-
sent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at
least 24 hours before the abortion is performed; § 3206, which mandates the informed
consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but provides a judicial bypass
procedure; § 3209, which commands that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married
woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her
husband; § 3203, which defines a "medical emergency" that will excuse compliance with
the foregoing requirements; and §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(0, which impose certain
reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services.
Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203, 3205, 3206, 3207, 3209, 3214 (1990)).
86. d. at 878.
87. Id. at 876.
88. Id. at 877.
89. Id. The Court did not specify whether once a statute is determined to be an undue burden,
it is therefore invalid or once the statute is determined to be an undue burden, a balancing test must
be done to determine if the statute is invalid.
90. See Julie F. Kowitz, Note, Not Your Garden Variety Tort Reform: Statutes Barring Claims
For Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Are Unconstitutional Under the Purpose Prong of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 235, 238-39 (1995); EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING
THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT 132 (1996).
91. McDONAGH, supra note 90, at 125 (1996) (stating that the Casey decision secured a
woman's right to an abortion). In April 1996, the Supreme Court used the Casey "undue burden"
standard when it refused to grant certiorari in Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 116 S.Ct. 1582
(1996). The Eighth Circuit determined that a South Dakota law, requiring physicians to notify the
parents of a minor seeking an abortion, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7 (MICHIE 1994), was un-
constitutional because it failed the undue burden test. Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452,
1458 (8th Cir. 1995).
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tion.92 The issue of viability, however, is still left to professional medical
determination."
B. Jane L. v. Bangerter94
1. Facts
A Utah statute contained a section regulating abortions occurring
before twenty weeks gestational age.95 Another section of the statute
regulated abortions after twenty weeks gestational age.96 The plaintiff,
Jane L., challenged the constitutionality of the statute.97
At trial, the court determined that the statute's provision regulating
abortions up to twenty weeks gestational age was unconstitutional,9" but
determined that the provision regulating abortions after twenty weeks
gestational age was constitutional and severable.99 Jane L. appealed the
district court's determination as to severability and the appellate court
reversed the lower court's decision.'0° After granting certiorari, the Su-
preme Court of the United States reversed the appellate court's determi-




The Tenth Circuit determined, on remand, that the provision regu-
lating abortions after twenty weeks gestational age was unconstitutional
because it placed an undue burden on the woman's rights to choose to
obtain an abortion in three instances."°2
92. Cal Thomas (CNBC television broadcast, Mar. 16, 1996) (interview of host Cal Thomas
with Dr. Richard Doerflinger of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and Dr. Peter Goodwin
of Oregon Death with Dignity), available in 1996 WL 7484498 (transcript of interview).
93. Patricia Schroeder, Statement On H.R. 1833-The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995
(stating the concern of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists that the partial-
birth abortion bill attempts to establish terminology that is not even recognized by the medical com-
munity), available in 1996 WL 8784986.
94. 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane L., 117 S. Ct. 2453
(1997).
95. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(2) (1995). Such circumstances include if "the abortion is
necessary to save the pregnant woman's life;" "the pregnancy is a result of rape... [or] incest;" or
"to prevent grave damage to the pregnant woman's medical health ... ."Id.
96. Id. § 6-7-302(3).
97. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 870 (D. Utah 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part, 61
F.3d 1493 (1Oth Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 S. Ct. 2068 (1996).
98. Jane L., 809 F. Supp. at 870.
99. Id. at 871. Severable means that because section 302(2) is unconstitutional does not mean
that section 302(3) is unconstitutional.
100. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1496-99.
101. JaneL., 116S.Ct.at2068.
102. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane
L., 117 S. Ct. 2453 (1997); see discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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Initially, the Tenth Circuit reiterated the principles established in
Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.'03 The court determined
that viability occurs when a fetus has a high chance of survival outside
the womb with or without artificial support,0 4 and asserted that this de-
termination should be made by the attending physician based on the in-
dividual circumstances. 5
The court also determined the constitutionality of section 302(3) of
the Utah Code.' 6 Through this statute, the legislature was effectively
defining viability as occurring at twenty weeks into gestation.' °7 In order
to resolve these issues, the Tenth Circuit Court identified the previability
standard' °8 as the most appropriate standard to resolve the case because
the statute affects the choices available to the woman before her fetus is
viable.
The court applied the "undue burden" standard' °9 and examined the
purpose of the legislation and the process leading to the creation of the
Utah statuteY° It concluded that section 302(3) was "enacted with the
specific purpose of placing an insurmountable obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking the nontherapeutic abortion of a nonviable fetus after
twenty weeks, and it therefore imposed an unconstitutional undue burden
on her right to choose under Casey.""'
103. JaneL., 102F.3dat1114-15.
104. Id. at 1115 ("Viability is reached when, in the judgment of the attending physician on the
particular facts of the case before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus' sustained sur-
vival outside the womb, with or without artificial support.").
105. Id.
Because this point may differ with each pregnancy, neither the legislature nor the courts
may proclaim one of the elements entering into the ascertainment of viability--be it
weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor-as the determinant of when
the State has a compelling interest in the life or health of the fetus. Viability is the critical
point.
Id. The court recognized that viability is a medical determination, one that courts are incapable of
making, though they have attempted to make this medical decision in previous cases. ); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976).
106. SeeJaneL., 102F.3dat 1115.
107. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(3) (1995) (suggesting that "20 weeks gestational age, meas-
ured from the date of conception" is essentially viability).
108. Jane L., 102 F.3d at 1115-16. The previability standard rejects the strict scrutiny standard.
Id. at 1115.
109. Id. at 1116. The lower court had apparently applied the Salerno test which required "the
challenger to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the law would be valid." Jane
L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 871-72 (D. Utah 1992). The Tenth Circuit determined that the
Casey Court specifically did not apply the Salerno test and instead applied the undue burden test.
Jane L., 102 F.3d at 1116.
110. Jane L., 102 F.3d at 1116.
Ill. Id. at 1117.
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C. Other Decisions
Recently, in Mazurek v. Armstrong,' 12 the Supreme Court reversed a
federal appeals court decision blocking enforcement of a 1995 Montana
law barring the performance of abortions except by licensed doctors." 3
In 1995, the Montana legislature enacted a statute that prohibited
physician assistants from performing abortions." 4 The statute was chal-
lenged by a group of physicians and the one physician assistant." 5 The
district court determined that they had not met the "undue burden" stan-
dard of Casey and therefore denied their motion for preliminary injunc-tion."' The appeals court remanded the case because the court deter-
mined that there may have been adequate evidence to meet the "undue
burden" standard." 7
The Supreme Court performed a balancing test, weighing the need to
ensure safe abortions by requiring that only doctors perform the opera-
tion against the undue burden on the woman's right to choose an abor-
tion. "8 Through this application of the "undue burden" test, the Court
determined that Montana's law was not a "substantial obstacle" to a
woman's right to choose an abortion.' 9
D. Analysis
In Jane L., the Tenth Circuit applied the "undue burden" test in a
manner slightly different than the one utilized by the Supreme Court,
although both courts weighed the government's interest in promoting life
against the constitutional rights of the women seeking abortions. In Jane
L., the Tenth Circuit determined that the woman's right to obtain a non-
therapeutic abortion of a nonviable fetus superceded the government's
stated interest in preserving life.120 The Jane L. court would not allow the
definition of this right to be narrowed. On the other hand, the Mazurek
Court considered that a statute preventing physician assistants in Mon-
tana from performing abortions did not place an "undue burden" on a
woman seeking an abortion.
112. 117 S.Ct. 1865 (1997) (percuriam).
113. Mazurek, 117 S. Ct. at 1869.
114. Id. at 1865. Since there was only one physician assistant who performed abortions, the
legislation seemed to be aimed at one person in particular. Id. at 1869-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id.at 1866.
116. Mazurek, 117 S. Ct. at 1866 (citing Armstrong v. Mazurek, 906 F. Supp. 561, 567 (D.
Mont. 1995)).
117. Id. at 1866 (citing Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 1996)). The district court
issued an injunction pending appeal which made the statute inapplicable to the physician assistant.
Id.
118. See David G. Savage, Court Affirms Abortion Laws: Justices Adhere to Legal Line They
Adopted in 1992 Cases, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), June 17, 1997, at 3A.
119. Mazurek, 117S. Ct. at 1867.
120. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Both courts applied the "undue burden" standard and considered
precedent as part of their analysis. Arguably, the two statutes regulated
two different people. While the statute in Jane L. directly affected a
woman's ability to obtain a specific abortion, the statute in Mazurek did
not directly affect that ability. Rather, the statute in Mazurek directly
affected the physician assistant and therefore, did not create an undue
burden on the woman seeking an abortion who could receive an abortion
from a licensed physician. This distinction is imperfect, however, be-
cause both statutes affect the woman's ability to obtain an abortion either
by narrowing the time in which she can get the abortion, or by reducing
the group of individuals who can legally administer an abortion. In rural
communities where there are few doctors, it may be an undue burden to
determine a physician's assistant cannot legally administer an abortion.
The Jane L. decision reduced the uncertainty 2' of the longevity and
strength of the Roe decision in the Tenth Circuit. It standardized Roe's
conclusion that "viability" is a conclusion that can be made only by
doctors. More importantly, the Tenth Circuit identified with the woman's
right to an abortion without an undue burden. If this is a continuing
trend, the Tenth Circuit will create a substantially solid foundation for
the rights of women. Other circuits may find this approach compelling.
22
Since the Mazurek decision by the United States Supreme Court came
after the Jane L. decision, however, it may limit the applicability of the
Jane L. trend.
III. DIETARY SUPPLEMENT REGULATION
A. Background
As society has become increasingly health conscious, the demand for
health-related products, such as vitamins and dietary supplements, in-
creases.123 Dietary supplements "claim to boost, balance, enhance,
cleanse, uplift or otherwise benefit every bodily organ and function," and
therefore have great appeal among consumers. 124 "[T]hey [are] now sold
and ballyhooed in grocery and drug stores, on radio and TV, through
direct mail and major magazines, and on the Internet.' ' 21 Many fear that
121. This uncertainty was partially created by Justice O'Connor's decision. See supra notes 80-
84 and accompanying text.
122. Recently, the House of Representatives discussed the values and demerits of a committee
bill that would prohibit federal and district funds to be used to pay for abortions with an exception
for endangerment of the life of the mother, rape, or incest. 143 CONG. REC. H8751 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
1997). The opposition expressed concern that language was unconstitutional because it placed an
undue burden on a woman's right to obtain an abortion.
123. Jane E. Brody, Millions Spent on Unproven Vitamins, DENVER POST, Oct. 31, 1997, at
A25.
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these products provide false hopes and waste consumers' money and
valuable time for treatment.'26
Like other food products, dietary supplements must meet a certain
standard established by the government. 127 In the past, manufacturers
used dietary supplement labels as the primary method to advertise to
consumers. By limiting the content of these labels, manufacturers argue,
the government effectively restricted the manufacturers' means to sell
their product.
28
In the 1980s, the FDA began an aggressive campaign against labels
making unsubstantiated health claims, giving particular attention to die-
tary supplements. 29 As a result of this campaign, Congress passed the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA). 3 ° The NLEA
applied to conventional foods, requiring standardized labeling and pro-
hibiting manufacturers from making false claims. 3' By enacting the
NLEA, Congress sought to increase the government's authority to regu-
late nutrition labeling and limit health claims that could be made about a
product.'3 2 Specifically, the Act designated the Secretary of Health and
Human Services as the regulator of nutritional labeling information. 13  In
response to these regulations, the FDA established similar standards for
dietary supplements. 34 Reacting to the FDA's increased regulation, die-
tary supplement manufacturers lobbied to prevent the FDA from regu-
lating the industry by telling consumers the FDA sought to decrease the
126. North American Health Claim Surf Day Targets Internet Ads: Hundreds of E-mail Mes-
sages Sent, FED. TRADE COMM'N NEWS RELEASE, Nov. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 689015
(stating that "[i]f it sounds to good to be true, it probably is," and this can lead to consumers wasting
money and investing hope and time into a fraudulent therapy) [hereinafter FrC]. Often cancer and
AIDS or HIV patients fall victim to the false hope of fraudulent health claims. Id. But see Patricia
Sabatini, Company Sells Unauthorized Diet Supplement: Pills' Health Claims Need FDA Approval,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 27, 1997, at C8 (quoting Arthur Whitmore, spokesperson for the
FDA, that "[a] majority of the industry does abide by the rules").
127. But see Alexander Volokh, Pruning the FDA, NAT'L REV., Aug. 11, 1997, at 44 (arguing
that the FDA's overzealous regulations hide helpful health information, to the detriment of the
public).
128. Labeling Rules for Supplements May Jump Start Fledgling Sector, CHEMICAL MARKET
REP., Oct. 20, 1997, at 16 [hereinafter Labeling Rules].
129. See Peter A. Vignuolo, The Herbal Street Drug Crisis: An Examination of the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 200, 212 (1997); Labeling
Rules, supra note 128 (arguing that consumers must have a solid understanding and basic knowledge
to make informed decisions about dietary supplements).
130. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353, 21
U.S.C. § 343-1 (1994).
131. Jennifer J. Spokes, Note, Confusion in Dietary Supplement Regulation: The Sports Prod-
ucts Irony, 77 B.U. L. REV. 181, 189 (1997).
132. National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 122 F.3d 878,880 (10th Cir. 1997).
133. See Vignuolo, supra note 129, at 212.
134. Spokes, supra note 131, at 189.
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available supplements. 3 ' In fact, the FDA sought to regulate claims on
the labels, not the number of supplements on the shelves.'36
In response to the conflict and a persuasive lobbying effort, the Die-
tary Supplement Act (DSA)' 37 put a one year moratorium on the en-
forcement of the NLEA."3' Further lobbying efforts eventually led to the
enactment of the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994
(DSHEA).' 39 The DSHEA shifted the burden of proof to the FDA to re-
but the presumption that the product is presumed safe."'
The FDA requires that dietary supplement labels offer a disclaimer,
explaining that certain claims have not been evaluated by the FDA and
that the supplement "is not intended to treat, cure or prevent any dis-
ease."' 141 Ironically, this allows manufacturers to make multiple claims
about their product on the dietary supplement without actual proof, pro-
vided they include the disclaimer on the label. 42 The DSHEA aided the
vitamin and mineral supplement manufacturers by establishing that the
FDA would not interfere unless something went wrong.' 43
The DSHEA also requires that the FDA develop standards for sup-
plement labels.'" Consistent information about vitamins and minerals is
lacking because qualitative long-range studies have never been con-
ducted, making conclusive determinations difficult. 45 In response to the
need for more information about supplements, Congress requested the
establishment of the Office of Dietary Supplements in 1995.' 6 In addi-
tion, the Presidential Commission on Dietary Supplements is authorized
to advise the FDA on the most effective methods of monitoring claims
135. See Vignuolo, supra note 129, at 204.
136. Id. at 213-16.
137. Dietary Supplement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491.
138. See Vignuolo, supra note 129, at 216-17.
139. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat.
4325. The DSHEA was an amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See Vignuolo,
supra note 129, at 204-06. Prior to the DSHEA, supplements were regulated as food or drugs. The
FDA approved for sale as food many ordinary vitamins and minerals while less common products
like herbs and hormones were withheld from sale. Marie McCullough, Americans Swallow the All-
Purpose Pills; Herbs: Debate Brewing Over Health Claims, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 11, 1997, at
B 1. Currently, however, as a result of the DHEA, the FDA considers vitamins and minerals as die-
tary supplements. Brody, supra note 123 (stating that the dietary supplement industry's lobbying
was coupled with a "letter-writing campaign by consumers who feared that government rules would
limit their access to supplements of all kinds").
140. See McCullough, supra note 124; Vignuolo, supra note 129, at 205.
141. McCullough, supra note 124.
142. Id. (stating that such claims are that a dietary supplement benefits "bodily 'structures,'
such as bone, or 'functions,' such as digestion").
143. Brody, supra note 123, at A25.
144. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, 21 U.S.C. § 343-2 (1994).
145. Brody, supra note 123, at A25.
146. Id.
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on dietary supplements. 47 The FDA approves the dietary supplement
labels based on the "significant scientific agreement" standard."4
The FDA's long range goals include changing the regulations of nu-
trient claims by modifying the classifications of dietary supplements,
providing percentage levels of dietary ingredients that have not been
already classified, and allowing manufacturers of vitamins and mineral
dietary supplements to display ingredients other than a vitamin or min-
eral on their labels. 49
B. National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala 5°
1. Facts
In National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala,151 the plaintiffs
brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a regulation that
mandates that prior to placing a dietary supplement with a health claim
label on the market, the FDA must issue an authorization to the seller of
the supplement.12 The FDA will authorize the health claims if it deter-
mines,
based on the totality of publicly available scientific evidence (in-
cluding evidence from well-designed studies conducted in a manner
which is consistent with generally recognized scientific procedures
and principles), that there is significant scientific agreement, among
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate
such claims, that the claim is supported by such evidence.
53
After this evaluation, the FDA may determine that the health claim is not
supported by the "publicly available evidence" and, therefore, refuse to
authorize the health claim label.5 4
The plaintiffs claimed that this regulation violated their right to free
speech under the First Amendment. 55 The defendants argued that the
plaintiffs lacked standing because the plaintiffs had not alleged an
147. Government Mulls Tougher Scrutiny of Supplements, ENVrL. NUiTRiTON, Aug. 1, 1997, at
3 (stating that the Commission recently encouraged "swift enforcement action" by the FDA to
monitor the safety of dietary supplements and this process will not increase the responsibility of the
manufacturer to prove the safety of the supplement).
148. See Food Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Foods, 58 Fed. Reg.
2478, 2504 (1993) (discussing the "significant scientific agreement" standard).
149. Food Labeling; Requirements for Nutrient Content Claims, Health Claims, and Statements
of Nutritional Support for Dietary Supplements, CHEMICAL BUS. NEWSBASE, Sept. 26, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 13725210.
150. 122 F.3d 878 (loth Cir. 1997).
151. National Council, 122 F.3d at 878.
152. Id. at 880.
153. 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(c) (1997).




injury."s Although the district court determined that the plaintiffs had
standing, the court found that there was no First Amendment violation.,57
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit court vacated the lower court's decision as to the
constitutionality of the regulations and dismissed the case on the grounds
that the plaintiffs lacked standing.'58 The Tenth Circuit reiterated the
three requirements for standing established by the Supreme Court.'59 The
court focused on the requirement that the plaintiff suffer an "injury in
fact." The court determined that in this case the plaintiffs challenged the
health claims regulations without demonstrating that the regulations
caused them a specific harm.'6t
A plaintiff may only assert his or her own constitutional rights. The
overbreadth doctrine, however, allows a plaintiff to assert First Amend-
ment rights of someone not before the court, but whose rights may be
infringed upon by an overly broad regulation.16' The overbreadth doc-
trine requires that the plaintiff suffer an injury as well. 162 Assertions of a
general nature are inadequate to constitute a specific and concrete
harm. 63 The court concluded that since "no potentially prohibited claim
ha[d] been made, there [was] no possible violation of the health claims
regulations and thus no possibility of prosecution. ' 64 The court then
determined that the lower court inaccurately applied the "overbreadth
doctrine," incorrectly expanding the notion of standing.
6 1
C. Analysis
The decision in National Council did not apply the NLEA or the
statute at issue. Although the court vacated the district court's determi-
nation that the regulation was constitutional, the court protected the abil-
ity of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to create and imple-
ment regulations by requiring that plaintiffs challenging these regulations
assert an injury in fact.
156. Id.
157. National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 893 F. Supp. 1512, 1516, 1520 (D. Utah
1995).
158. National Council, 122 F.3d at 883.
159. Id. at 881 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)). First, the plaintiffs
must claim "an injury in fact." In addition, plaintiffs must show causation. Finally, the plaintiffs
must show that a favorable decision will likely cure the plaintiff's injury. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. at 555.
160. National Council, 122 F.3d at 883.
161. Id. at 881 (citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S.
620, 634 (1980)).
162. Id. at 882 (citing Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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Targeting the nutritional supplement industry, the FDA recently es-
tablished final regulations for labeling which will take effect in April
1999."6 Furthermore, the Food and Nutrition Board167 recently revised
the Recommended Daily Allowances. 168 The new regulations are not
ironclad like regulations in other industries. 169 Despite progress, dietary
supplements may still be sold without necessarily providing proof of
safety or effectiveness, 7° which could jeopardize the public's need to
safeguard itself against fraudulent claims.' 7 '
V. THE PHYsIcIAN/HosPITAL RELATIONSHIP
A. Background
Before Medieval times in Europe, hospitals were viewed as charita-
ble (and often religious) resting places for the sick, rather than a place in
which one would be cured.'72 When Europeans settled in the Colonies,
they brought this "tradition of charitable giving.' ' 73 The modem hospital
evolved in the eighteenth century, and over time has become more avail-
able to serve varied medical concerns.
At the beginning of this century, hospitals catered to the poor be-
cause the wealthier patients preferred to have private doctors care for
them in their homes.175 As hospitals acquired more advanced technology,
medical education improved and surgery became more centralized in the
hospitals. As hospitals became more respectable, more individuals
elected to be cared for in a hospital, increasing the need for more sophis-
ticated regulation of hospitals.1
76
166. Labeling Rules, supra note 128, at 16.
167. The Food and Nutrition Board makes recommendations about intake levels of vitamins
and minerals. See Brody, supra note 123, at A25.
168. Id.
169. See Labeling Rules, supra note 128, at 16 (stating that regulations like the Good Manu-
facturing Practices or monographs are more concrete).
170. Sabatini, supra note 126, at 68.
171. FTC, supra note 126 (providing measures to better inform the public). The public needs to
be aware of products that "advertis[e] as a quick and effective cure-all for a wide range of ailments
or for an undiagnosed pain ... [or] .. .use key words, such as 'scientific breakthrough,' 'miraculous
cure,' 'exclusive product,' and 'secret ingredient."' Id.
172. See Helena G. Rubinstein, Note, Nonprofit Hospitals and the Federal Tax Exemption: A
Fresh Prescription, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 381, 390 (1997). The sick were usually cared for by clerics
or knights, rather than doctors. Id.
173. See id. at 391. "As in Europe, almshouses, the forerunners of American hospitals,
'serv[ed] general welfare functions and only incidentally car[ed] for the sick,' housing them together
with the elderly, the insane, and the orphaned." Id. (quoting PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 149 (1982)) (alterations in original).
174. See id.
175. See Dallet, supra note 25, at 331.
176. See id. at 331-32.
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The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAHO) was
created in 1952 to combat the lack of standards among hospitals.'" The
JCAHO increased the standards necessary for hospital accreditation and,
since that time, has primarily set the standards for hospital, medical staff,
and physicians.'78 The JCAHO determined that each hospital must adopt
medical bylaws, to which the hospital and practicing physicians agree. 7 9
These bylaws have been described as "a contract between the hospital
and the physician."'8° The immunity provisions in the bylaws were in-
tended to protect the hospital and its personnel from suits alleging defa-
mation or another claim arising from determinations made in the peer
review process. 8 '
Responding to the need to create a higher standard of medical care
and to the increasing instances of medical malpractice, Congress passed
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act'82 in 1986.83 Congress recog-
nized that "[tihe threat of private money damage liability ... unreasona-
bly discourages physicians from participating in effective professional
peer review."' 84 Congress sought to provide an ideal environment for
professional peer review in the medical community which required en-
suring immunity from damage actions to all those who qualify.'85 A
member of a peer review board is considered immune if the action meets
four requirements, including that the action must be taken
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of
quality health care, (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of
the matter, (3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are af-
forded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are
fair to the physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the reason-
able belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after
such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after meeting the require-
ment [regarding the conduct of the hearing]. 86
As hospitals' liability has increased, hospitals have focused on im-
proving the quality of care within their facilities.'87 The peer review pro-
cess is the primary means by which hospitals guarantee that the quality
of care remains high by establishing a mandatory level of performance
for the physicians as a prerequisite to obtaining hospital privileges.' 88
177. See id. at 332.
178. See id.
179. See MILLER, supra note 5, at 161.
180. Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1991).
181. Rees, 808 P.2d at 1076.
182. 42U.S.C. §§ 11101, 11111-11115, 11131-11137, 11151-11152(1994).
183. Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1333 (10th Cir. 1996).
184. Brown, 101 F.3d at 1333 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4)).
185. Id.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a).
187. See Dallet, supra note 25, at 326-37.
188. See id. at 327.
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Hospital privileges entitle a physician to admit his patients to a hos-
pital for treatment. 89 Without those privileges, the physician cannot have
access to the hospital's equipment, staff, and supplies.' 9 Whether or not
a physician will be granted hospital privileges depends on the peer re-
view process.' 9' The peer review board may reject the physician appli-
cant's initial application to obtain hospital privileges, or the board may
not renew privileges, or may even limit the physician's hospital privi-
leges.' 92
B. Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Services' 93
1. Facts
Dr. Brown was a physician with Lincoln County Medical Center
(Medical Center).194 The Medical Center, managed by Presbyterian
Healthcare Services, revoked her hospital privileges, after Dr. Williams,
an economic competitor of Dr. Brown, conducted an initial peer review
proceeding.' 95 Later, formal peer review revealed that Brown breached a
consultation agreement with the hospital by not obtaining proper con-
sultation with other doctors.' 96 As a result, the peer review board recom-
mended that the hospital terminate Brown's privileges, an approach
which the Medical Center adopted.
97
Following the disciplinary action, the Medical Center filed a report
regarding the revocation of Brown's privileges with the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank (Data Bank).' 98 It was determined that Brown's per-
formance would be classified as "Incompetence/Malpractice/-
Negligence."'" Brown submitted her own report to the Data Bank,
claiming that the Medical Center never found her incompetent, guilty of
malpractice, or negligent.' ° Although the Medical Center was notified
that Brown had submitted a report, the Medical Center did not take the
opportunity to revise its report.2 '
At trial, the jury found for Dr. Brown on her claims for defamation,
tortious interference with a contract, and some of Brown's antitrust
189. See id. at 329.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Hospitals and Asylums § 10. A difference exists in the process
whether a physician seeks hospital privileges at a public or private hospital. Id.
193. 101 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1996).
194. Brown, 101 F.3d at 1327.
195. Id. at 1327-28.








claims. The judge set aside the jury's award of damages for tortious in-
terference with a contract claim and the award of punitive damages
against Dr. Williams on the antitrust claim.202 Both Brown and Presbyte-




The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court committed no er-
ror, but determined that the court should not have set aside the jury
award of damages for Brown's claim of intentional interference with a
contract.2° In its analysis of Brown's issues on appeal, the court consid-
ered that a jury's award of damages should not be disturbed unless
"clearly erroneous or there is no evidence to support the award. '205 After
reviewing the financial analysis of two witnesses, the court concluded
that Presbyterian's interference caused financial harm to Brown's prac-
tice and would provide a "reasonable basis for estimating the plaintiff's
loss."' ' In addition, the court concluded that Dr. Brown presented
enough evidence such that a jury could reasonably determine the amount
of loss to the plaintiff.27 Therefore, the court determined that the evi-
dence was sufficient for the jury to have made an accurate determination
of compensatory damages.' The court reversed the district court's order
vacating the award.209 The court also concluded that the punitive dam-
ages must be reinstated. 2'0 The court determined, however, that the award
of punitive damages against Dr. Williams would be duplicative and im-
proper and therefore, affirmed the district court's decision to set aside
those damages.21'
In addition, the court concluded that the hospital was not immune
from damages resulting from the revocation of Dr. Brown's privileges
pursuant to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act.21 2 Dr. Brown
proved that reasonable efforts were not taken by the peer review board to
gather the facts about her,213 failing to meet one of the requirements un-
der the Act.2t4
202. Id. at 1327.
203. Id. at 1329.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1330.
206. Id.




211. Id. at 1332.
212. Id. at 1333-34 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1), (2) (1994)).
213. Id. at 1333.
214. Id. at 1334.
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The court also rejected Miller's immunity claim.2"' The court as-
serted that immunity would apply to Miller if she did not have "knowl-
edge of the falsity of the information contained in the report [to the Data
Bank]. 216 Because Miller assisted in the preparation of the report which
stated that Dr. Brown was negligent, incompetent, and guilty of mal-
practice, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to have reasonably concluded that this report was false and that Ms.
Miller was aware of that fact.
2 17
The court also responded to the Medical Center's claim that the trial
court committed error in failing to enter judgment as a matter of law in
their favor with regards to Brown's antitrust claim.1 8 The court con-
cluded that both Ms. Miller and Dr. Williams were very involved in the
decision making process that revoked Brown's privileges. 219 A jury could
reasonably have concluded that Dr. Williams and Ms. Miller "controlled,
coerced or unduly influenced the decisionmaking process. ' '2
Finally, the court resolved Ms. Miller's claim that the district court
erroneously failed to award her judgment as a matter of law based on the
merits of Dr. Brown's defamation claim.22' The court concluded that
Brown established actual injury because hospitals check the National
Data Bank record every time they receive an application for privileges. A
negative comment about Dr. Brown would harm her chances to be ap-
proved for other privileges.
22
C. Other Circuits
In Davila-Lopes v. Zapata,223 the First Circuit determined that a
physician did not a have a property interest in a hospital's grant of privi-
leges.22' Dr. Davila-Lopes sought re-instatement of his hospital privileges
at Puerto Rico regional hospital.22 Since the hospital was financed by the
Commonwealth, all of the hospital bylaws were approved by the Secre-
tary of Health.226 The bylaws of the hospital were "comprehensive and
procedurally detailed 27 and included a requirement that prior to any
hearing the physician must be given notice "contain[ing] a concise





219. Id. at 1335.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1335-36.
222. Id. at 1336.
223. 111 F.3d 192 (1st Cir. 1997).
224. Zapata, 11I F.3d at 197.
225. Id. at 193.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 194.
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tient records] or the other reasons or subject matter forming the basis for
the adverse recommendation." '228
The hospital declined to reinstate the plaintiff's hospital
privileges. 29 Prior to a final decision, the plaintiff attempted to obtain a
statement describing the reasons for the refusal,230 however, he never
received this notice.23" ' The court concluded that the hospital did not fol-
low the procedures established in the bylaws.2 32 Although a requirement
of adequate process in decisions affecting hospital privileges can create a
property interest,233 the court determined that even though there was a




Courts appear to accept regulations that closely monitor physicians'
practices. The Tenth Circuit and the First Circuit defined the manner in
which hospitals would be monitored. Although the First Circuit did not
define the hospital privileges as a physician's property interests, the court
determined that the hospital had deviated from its bylaws, infringing on
the physician's right. The Tenth Circuit concluded that in addition to
hospitals and peers monitoring physicians, the court also must monitor
the evaluation process itself.
As more nonprofit hospitals become private hospitals, 235 the peer re-
view process may have a dilatory effect on the hospital services available
to patients. The goal of these hospitals has changed from charity to
profit.2' Many of the sales of hospitals or joint ventures that are estab-
lished are between these nonprofit hospitals and a for-profit company.
237
The for-profit company will make the decisions for the hospital.2 38 These
decisions, based on the ultimate goal of profit, may result in a trimming
of services and responses to community needs.23 9 The peer review proc-
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CONCLUSION
The multi-faceted health care system combines public federal, state,
and local programs, private insurance, charity, and individual
payments. 24° Each level of the health care system supports varying needs
of the constituents. Tenth Circuit health law reflects the diversity of the
overall health care system. It has followed the general trend towards im-
proving conditions for patients. First, hospital and physician regulation
has been more clearly defined to increase the quality of care for patients.
Second, the Secretary of Health and Human Services continues to clarify
health claim regulations, which provide more knowledge to consumers
and decrease the chances that consumers will be misled by false claims.
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the issue of a woman's right to an
abortion. The term "viability" remains flexible because the Supreme
Court recognized its inability to define the term, preferring to allow the
medical experts to determine on a pregnancy-by-pregnancy basis. Ac-
cordingly, the Tenth Circuit has upheld the "undue burden" standard.
The Tenth Circuit is striving towards better conditions for patients
and consumers of the health care system. Although this requires in-
creased regulation, that is a small price to pay to ensure health.
Christyne J. Vachon
240. CUNIFF & MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at 4.
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